The probationary governmental programme agreed on by the PA and the JVP will be decisive for both the PA and the UNP. It will be still more decisive for the JVP, for whatever it does during this period will be an indication of its political maturity, its ability to act on the basis of firm principles, and its honesty.
There are significant differences between the conditions included in the agreement and those included in the programme publicised by the JVP before it started discussions with the government. Let us first consider the conditions in the agreement.
Although the JVP tries to show that cancellation of the referendum and resummoning of parliament before September 7 were a victory, it cannot be considered an important victory for the people. The government cancelled the referendum because of public protests in the country.
If resummoning of parliament had taken place just after the prorogation, then it could be said it was a victory for the JVP. But it took place just one day before the scheduled day of September 7. Astrological advice that September 7 was an inauspicious day could be a more likely cause than the JVP demand for the resummoning of parliament on September 6.
The next condition that has pleased the JVP is the reduction of the cabinet to 20. The question arises whether it was a JVP initiative or it was a case of the JVP demanding the PA to implement its 1994 election promise. This is what the PA manifesto says on the subject:
“The irresponsible and vulgar record of the UNP’s criminal expenditure of a large some of money to raise the living standards of the politicians of the ruling party is unparalleled in any other country. More than Rs. 2000 million is spent annually for the payment of salaries and allowances of 91 ministers alone.
“We promise the people that the government of the People’s Alliance will not appoint more than 20 ministers. The resources so saved will be used for the benefit of the people.”
There weren’t 91 ministers in the Wijetunga cabinet or in the Premadasa cabinet. The number of ministers including the President in the Wijetunga government in August 1993 was 25. The number of ministers including the President in the Premadasa government of 1991 was 22.
When the PA said there were 91 ministers in the UNP government, it took into consideration not only the cabinet ministers but also all the deputy ministers and the project ministers too. It means that when the PA promised 20 ministers it should have included not only the cabinet but all the ministers including the deputy ministers. It means that the total number of the ministers and the deputy ministers should be 20. However, the JVP, by its probationary programme appears to have permitted about double the number promised by the PA.
The other factor that would have a beneficial effect on the country and which is the most important one in the probationary programme is the setting up of independent commissions through the 17th Amendment. According to Section 5 of the PA-JVP memorandum of understanding, the 17th Amendment which envisages the setting up of the constitutional council and independent commissions for public service, the judiciary, elections and the police should be passed before tomorrow. The constitutional council must be established before October 5. However the agreement contains a controversial provision which brings the 17th Amendment into doubt.
The proposal for the constitutional council and the four independent commissions included in the 17th Amendment is not one that has come from the political parties but was an idea emanated from members of civil society. This idea was backed by all opposition political parties, including the UNP and the JVP.
The idea that a constitutional council should be set up and the right to select and appoint members of the four independent commissions and of other institutions that will come under the constitutional council came up due to alleged abuse of power by heads of state when top posts were filled. Some of these political appointees had become tools to serve the narrow political interests of the executive, it is alleged.
If the JVP succeeds in getting the council and commissions to work towards the objectives expected of them, then the credit should go to the JVP. But if the probationary programme is going to bring a puppet constitutional council which the executive can manipulate easily, then the independent commissions will fail entirely and if that happens the JVP also will have to share a major part of the discredit and dishonour.
The composition of the constitutional council has stirred a major debate. To achieve this, the President has floated a proposal through the JVP that she also must be allowed to nominate a member to the council, to which both the Prime Minister and the Opposition leader will also nominate three members each. It is not known that the JVP has followed a policy of objecting to it with all its might in view of the viciousness of the proposal.
If moves to strengthen democracy through the constitutional council and independent commissions are stifled by politics, then what the country will get is a distorted system that will only help the government in office. If the JVP lends its support to such a programme, the JVP will be held responsible for the denial of the opportunity that existed to get a system to promote democracy and good governance.