The PA’s defeat at the coming parliamentary election is inevitable. The closing of the possibility for electoral malpractices, a powerful group in the PA joining the UNP, the SLMC and the CWC contesting the election in alliance with the UNP will be the main factors that will contribute to UNP’s victory.
Although it is still too early to forecast the extent of the victory that the UNP is going to get and the defeat that the PA is going to suffer, it is not impossible to assess the general nature of the changes that might take place.
At the presidential election of 1999, the PA was able to get 4,312,157 votes or 51.12% of the total valid votes. At the parliamentary election of 2000 that figure dropped to 3,900,901 or 45.10%.
The UNP was able to get 3,602,748 votes or 42.71% of the total votes at the presidential election. However at the parliamentary election they got only 3,477,770 votes or 40.21% of the total votes.
Although there is reason to believe that the PA had printed and used a million bogus ballot papers at the 1999 presidential election, the number which were actually used is not clear. There are reasons to believe that an extremely subtle and corrupt programme which could not be detected at first sight was implemented at the parliamentary election of 2000.
It may be surmised that, if the number of votes that were added to the PA’s vote were removed, there would have been an extremely close contest at the presidential election and that the UNP would have been ahead at the parliamentary election of 2000.
S. B. Dissanayake who worked the PA’s election machine is no longer with the PA. It is not clear whether it will be possible to implement that subtle programme even without him.
If the powers vested in the Commissioner of Elections by the 17th Amendment to the Constitution is properly used, the possibility for the PA to use state resources for election work as well as the possibility for rascally practices will be limited to some extent. The resultant advantage will go to the opposition.
If the UNP succeeds in contesting as a grand alliance which includes the SLMC and the CWC, it will be able to secure for itself the support of the Muslim people in the Eastern Province and especially those scattered throughout the country, while the support of the CWC will exert a decisive impact on the Central Province and a fair impact on the Sabaragamuwa Province.
Although the charges that can be levelled against some who crossed over to the UNP are very serious, that break brought a powerful new group to the UNP’s political stage.
At every election after 1994, the UNP was on the defensive rather than on the offensive in its campaign. The PA on the other hand was always on the offensive rather than the defensive.
However, in a context in which a powerful group from the PA has joined the UNP and in which the President has become the main political target of that group it may be surmised that the UNP for the first time will give up its defensive attitude and move onto an offensive campaign.
The UNP’s propaganda machine compared with that of the PA, is extremely weak. At elections, the PA made use of state media in a clever and subtle way though it was against the law. However, due to the 17th Amendment, the PA’s ability to make use of state media will probably be limited to a great extent.
However, the PA has set up a private radio station of its own and due to the close friendship that Mr. Samaraweera has with the proprietors of Swarnavahini, the PA is likely to attempt to use Swarnavahini and the radio services connected with it, for its own political purposes. If some control is established on the Lake House, the PA will be in such a position that it will not be able to get the support of any other printed media. It is a price that the PA will have to pay for the hatred it spread against newspapers.
The PA is financially stronger than the UNP which is considered the representative of the capitalist class. However, if those in the PA who have money consider it better to keep the money rather than spend it on a losing election, then the election campaign of the PA might be further debilitated.
Apparently, the UNP too had faced the problem of inadequacy of finances. However, as the UNP appears to be the likely winner, it will probably be able to conduct this election without financial difficulties.
In the final analysis everything will be decided on the extent of the UNP’s victory and the extent of the PA’s defeat. The President has declared December 5 as the election date and has left a long interval until January 1 for the summoning of Parliament allegedly to leave room for a back-door transaction after the election.
The leaders of the PA have a secret hope to form a government with the support of the JVP even if the PA loses the election narrowly. Although the CWC and the SLMC are to contest under the UNP, the leadership of the PA thinks that there is great room for back-door transactions after the election because those two parties will be able to leave the UNP anytime they choose. However, there will be such a possibility only if the contest is going to be a very close one.
The UNP’s defeat at the parliamentary election of 1994 was not a bad one although it was held after 17 years of UNP rule. While the victorious PA got 48.94% of the total valid votes, the UNP was able to retain 44.54% of the total valid votes. Even in 1970 when the UNP was reduced to 19 seats, the PA got 39% of the total valid votes. The UNP was able to retain 37.09% of the valid votes. However, at the election of 1997 in which the SLFP was reduced to 8 seats, the UNP got 50.9% of the total valid votes while the SLFP was able to get 29.7% votes only.
The SLFP-led United Front which had got 40.4% of the votes cast at the parliamentary election of 1965 increased its ratio of the votes to 49% at its victory in 1970. The UNP which had got 37.9% at the election of 1970 increased its vote to 50.9% when it won in 1977. Thereafter, the SLFP which had got 29.7% in 1977 increased its vote to 48.94% at the election of 1994 in which it won.
The increase in the vote of the United Front in 1970 when it was victorious was equivalent to 8.6%. The UNP’s increase in 1977 when it was victorious was 13.0%. The PA’s increase at its victory in 1994 was 21.24%. The average increase in these three victories was 14.2%.
Accordingly the UNP which is in an alliance with a number of other parties is likely to reach 50% of the total votes cast. If that happens, the number of MPs (including those in the National List), it will get 125 seats. SLMC and the CWC might get about 17 seats. If the alliance of Tamil parties excluding the EPRLF gets 10 seats, all other parties including the PA, NP, EPRLF and Sihala Urumaya will be left with 90 seats only. Accordingly, the number of seats that the PA gets can come down to 75.